Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2005

Vernon Ray Rigby v. Loralie Kemp Rigby : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jay L. Kessler; Attorney for Appellee.
David J. Friel; Attorney for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Rigby v. Rigby, No. 20050616 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2005).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/5903

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

VERNON RAY RIGBY,
Petitioner/Appellant,

Appellate Case No. 20050616
LORALIE KEMP RIGBY,
Respondent/Appellee.

APPELLEE BRIEF

Appeal from Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Decree of Divorce entered June 13, 2005, by the Third District Trial Court
Judge Robert W. Adkins (All parties contained in caption)
Jay L. Kessler, (8550)
Attorney for Appellee
Kessler Law Office, L.L.C.
9117 West 2700 South, #A
Magna, Utah 84044
Telephone: (801) 252-1400

David J. Friel, (6225)
Attorneys for Appellant
2875 S. Decker Lake Drive
Suite 225
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119
Telephone: (801)975-1122

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS
• A P R ' 1 0 2006

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

VERNON RAY RIGBY,
Petitioner/Appellant,
v.
Appellate Case No. 20050616
LORALIE KEMP RIGBY,
Respondent/Appellee.

APPELLEE BRIEF
Appeal from Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Decree of Divorce entered June 13, 2005, by the Third District Trial Court
Judge Robert W. Adkins (All parties contained in caption)
Jay L. Kessler, (8550)
Attorney for Appellee
Kessler Law Office, L.L.C.
9117 West 2700 South, #A
Magna, Utah 84044
Telephone: (801) 252-1400

David J. Friel, (6225)
Attorneys for Appellant
2875 S. Decker Lake Drive
Suite 225
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119
Telephone: (801) 975-1122

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

3

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

4

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

4

STANDARD OF REVIEW

5

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

6-12

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

12

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

12-14

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

..14

ARGUMENT
POINT I
The trial court properly issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and the Decree of Divorce sufficient in analyzing the parties' income,
expenses, needs, and equitable concerns, such as the length of the
marriage and contemptuous actions by the Petitioner, to make an
award of alimony which equalizes the parties' income
14-19
POINT II
The trial court properly divided the equity in the parties' home by
taking into consideration the award of attorney's fees granted to the
Respondent, and the serious contempt issues adjudicated against
the Petitioner; and the trial court did not abuse his discretion with
respect to finding the Petitioner in contempt in several areas.... 19-22
POINT III
The Appellant did not properly marshal the evidence in this matter,
and as such, the appeal should be denied
22-23
CONCLUSION

24

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

25

ADDENDUM

26
2

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
U.C.A. §30-3-5

6-12

U.R.A.P. Rule 3

4

Doelle v. Bradley. 784 P.2d 1176, 1178 (1986)

4, 23

Ashton v. Ashton. 733 P.2d 147, 150 (Utah 1987)

5

State of Utah v. PenaT 869 P.2d 932 (1994)

5

State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 781-82 (Utah 1991)
Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73, 79 (Ut. Ct App. 1991)
Munns v. Munns. P.2d 116, 121 (Utah Ct.App. 1990)
Haumont v. Haumont. 793 P.2d 421, 423 (Utah Ct.App. 1990)
In re CannetellaT 2006 P.3d 89, (UT Ct. App. March, 2006)

3

5
5, 23
15
17, 18
19

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
VERNON RAY RIGBY,
Petitioner/Appellant,

Appellate Case No. 20050616
LORALIE KEMP RIGBY,
Respondent/Appellee.

APPELLEE BRIEF
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
ISSUES FOR REVIEW
1. Are the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of
Divorce sufficient in analyzing the parties' income, expenses, needs, and
equitable concerns, such as the length of the marriage and contemptuous
actions by the Petitioner, to make an award of alimony which equalizes the
parties' income?
2. Did the trial court abuse it's discretion in holding the Petitioner in
contempt, and in dividing the equity in the marital property 15% to
petitioner and 85% to the Respondent?
3. Has the Petitioner/Appellant properly marshaled the evidence
pursuant to Doelle v. Bradley. 784 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Utah 1989)?
4

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Utah Supreme Court has held that, "Trial courts are given
primary responsibility for making determinations of fact. Findings of fact
are reviewed by an appellate court under the clearly erroneous standard.
For a reviewing court to find clear error, it must decide that the factual
findings made by the trial court are not adequately supported by the
record, resolving all disputes in the evidence in a light most favorable to
the trial court's determination." State of Utah v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932
(1994).
The appellate court's standard of review with regard to issues of law
are, "that all applications of law to findings of fact that produce conclusions
of law are reviewed under a nondeferential standard, i.e., for correctness."
State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781-82 (Utah 1991).
In reviewing marshaled evidence, the appellate court standard of
review requires the appellate court to defer to the trial court's judgment and
not to disturb it so long as the court finds that the trial court has exercised
its discretion in accordance with the standards set by this state's appellate
courts. Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73, 79 (Ut. Ct App. 1991).
If the appellate court does not have marshaled evidence, "there is no
reason to disturb the trial court's findings." Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147,
150 (Utah 1987).

5

STATUTORY PROVISIONS
§30-3-5- of the Utah Code Annotated
Disposition of property - Maintenance and health care of parties
and children - Division of debts - Court to have continuing
jurisdiction - Custody and parent-time - Determination of alimony —
Nonmeritorious petition for modification.
(1) When a decree Of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it
equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and
parties. The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children;
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order
requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital,
and dental care insurance for the dependent children;
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint
debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during
marriage;
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or obligees,
regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and
regarding the parties* separate, current addresses; and
6

(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; and
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter
11, Recovery Services.
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the
employment or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that
the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would
be adequately cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial
parent to provide child care for the dependent children, necessitated by the
employment or training of the custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or
new orders for the custody of the children and their support, maintenance,
health, and dental care, and for distribution of the property and obligations
for debts as is reasonable and necessary.
(4) Child support, custody, visitation, and other matters related to children
born to the mother and father after entry of the decree of divorce may be
added to the decree by modification.
7

(5) (a) In determining parent-time rights of parents and visitation rights of
grandparents and other members of the immediate family, the court shall
consider the best interest of the child.
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer
enforcement, the court may include in an order establishing a parent-time
or visitation schedule a provision, among other things, authorizing any
peace officer to enforce a court-ordered parent-time or visitation schedule
entered under this chapter.
(6) If a petition for modification of child custody or parent-time provisions of
a court order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay
the reasonable attorneys' fees expended by the prevailing party in that
action, if the court determines that the petition was without merit and not
asserted or defended against in good faith.
(7) If a petition alleges noncompliance with a parent-time order by a parent,
or a visitation order by a grandparent or other member of the immediate
family where a visitation or parent-time right has been previously granted
by the court, the court may award to the prevailing party costs, including
actual attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party
because of the other party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered
visitation or parent-time.
8

(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining
alimony:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support;
(iv) the length of the marriage;
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring
support;
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated
by the payor spouse; and
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the
payor spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor spouse
or allowing the payor spouse to attend school during the marriage.
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony.
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living,
existing at the time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance
with Subsection (8)(a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts
and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the
standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short
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duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the
marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed at the
time of the marriage.
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize
the parties' respective standards of living.
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major
change in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective efforts of
both, that change shall be considered in dividing the marital property and in
determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's earning capacity has
been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both spouses during the
marriage, the court may make a compensating adjustment in dividing the
marital property and awarding alimony.
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, and
no children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the court
may consider restoring each party to the condition which existed at the
time of the marriage.
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes
and new orders regafding alimony based on a substantial material change
in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce.
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(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to
address needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time the decree was
entered, unless the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify that
action.
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of the
payor may not be considered, except as provided in this Subsection (8).
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial ability to
share living expenses.
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if the court
finds that the payor's improper conduct justifies that consideration.
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of
years that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination of
alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the payment
of alimony for a longer period of time.
(9) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically
terminates upon the remarriage or death of that former spouse. However, if
the remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of
alimony shall resume if the party paying alimony is made a party to the
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action of annulment and his rights are determined.
(10) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former
spouse is cohabitating with another person.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Court of Appeals should dismiss this appeal due to the Findings
of Fact Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce supporting the trial
record of analyzing the income, expenses, needs and equitable concerns,
including the length of the marriage and Petitioner's contempt of court.
Secondly, the Appellate's lack of marshaling the evidence warrant
this matter's summary dismissal pursuant to well-established case law.
PERTINENT STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 27, 2005, this divorce case went to trial wherein the
following matters were adjudicated: jurisdiction; personal property; the
marital home; debts and obligations; the parties' income; the parties'
expenses; alimony; retirement accounts; life and health insurance benefits;
four issues of contempt; and attorney's fees, a proposed Decree of
Divorce in this matter was served by Petitioner's counsel via mail to the
Respondent's counsel. (See Addendum A-Memorandum Decision).
Although there is not a sub-paragraph denoted specifically toward
the actual expenses of the parties, the district court judge calculated the
12

actual expenses and subtracted them from the parties' respective incomes,
and formulated the alimony award as outlined in the sub-section entitled
"Alimony". (See Addendum A).
Expenses were thoroughly discussed and was an integral part of
formulating the alimony award as outlined in the trial record. Each parties'
Financial Declaration was utilized and admitted into evidence. Mr. Rigby's
Financial Declaration was discussed and entered on pages 164-169 of the
Trial Transcript; and Ms. Rigby's was discussed and entered on pages
176-178 of the Trial Transcript.
Mr. Rigby admitted that what he filed was his Financial Declaration.
(Trial Transcript- page 164, par.9).
Mr. Rigby admitted that his net income from his wages and pension
amounted to $1,974.33 per month. (Trial Transcript- page 164 paras.
18-25 and 165, par.4).
Mr. Rigby admitted that his expenses amounted to $1,172.64 per
month. (Trial Transcript- page 166, paras. 11-22).
Evidence was taken showing that Mr. Rigby was supposed to pay
$763.00 per month for the mortgage, in which he was two months behind.
(Trial Transcript- page 167, par. 23-25, and page 168 paras. 1-5).
Ms. Rigby admits her income from wages to be net $1,309.80 per
month. (Trial Transcript- page 177, paras.5-9).
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Ms. Rigby admits her expenses to be approximately $1,335.00 per
month. (Trial Transcript- page 177, paras. 18-20).
Ms. Rigby admits that her expenses do not include rent which if she
would leave her mother's home would amount to $650.00 per month in
further expense. (Trial Transcript- page 177, paras.21-23).
Ms. Rigby admits that the home is financed in her name alone, which
prompted the Court to give him 60 days to refinance the home, or to put
the home up for sale. ( See Addendum B-Affidavit of Loralie Rigby; File
Jan. 12, 2004) and (Addendum C-Law and Motion Minutes; Jan. 20,
2004).
Mr. Rigby admitted that he used marital money for his own purposes.
(Trial Transcript- pages 170-175).
SUMMARY AND THE ARGUMENTS
I. Are the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of
Divorce sufficient in analyzing the parties' income, expenses, needs,
and equitable concerns, such as the length of the marriage and
contemptuous actions by the Petitioner, to make an award of alimony
which equalizes the parties' income?
The Utah Court of Appeals has held that the purposes of an alimony
award include enabling the receiving spouse to maintain, as nearly as
possible, the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage, and
14

preventing the receiving spouse from becoming a public charge. Munns v.
Munns. P.2d 116, 121 (Utah Ct.App. 1990).
Recognizing that each divorce case is different, with many fairness
issues to weigh, the legislature adopted §30-3-5 of the Utah Code
Annotated, which grants the trial court wide discretion to the division of
property, alimony, division of debts, and the custody and maintenance of
children.
The Code states in pertinent part:
1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include
in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or
obligations, and parties.
(8)(a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in
determining alimony:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support;
(iv) the length of the marriage;
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children
requiring support;
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned
or operated by the payor spouse; and
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any
increase in the payor spouse's skill by paying for education
received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse to
attend school during the marriage.
Even though the Appellee, Ms. Rigby, was staying with her mother,
she was married to Mr. Rigby for thirty-three years at the time of the
divorce trial. The Court heard evidence that Ms. Rigby did not earn enough
15

money to get her own apartment, while Mr. Rigby continued to live in the
marital home. (Trial Transcript page 177, paras. 10-25). Fortunately, Ms.
Rigby was able to temporarily live with her mother.
Careful testimony was given regarding the monthly income, earning
capacity, and expenses of the parties. It was even hotly contested. In cross
examination, Mr. Rigby tried to prove that Ms. Rigby's expenses were not
what she expressed on her Financial Declaration because she did not write
a check or give cash to her mother in the amount of $200.00 for rent. Ms.
Rigby explained that $200.00 were her costs in providing services for her
mother. (Trial Transcript pages 67-70). The trial court had all of this
information to weigh, and even stated in open court," I understand that,
that she is saying she does not pay, has not paid $200.00 a month rent.
And that's - that does differ from what's in the financial disclosure
statement." (Trial Transcript page 70, paras. 19-22).
Ms. Rigby clarified her "rental" expenses by stating that she expends
gasoline, food, and the value of helping her mother get to her medical
appointments due to her lupus; and that her rental amount was a
"guesstimate" of the value of her services. (Trial Transcript page 68, paras.
1-25; and page 90, paras. 8-12).
The Utah Court of Appeals stated that in determining alimony, a trial
court must consider three factors: (1) the financial condition and needs of
the receiving spouse, (2) the ability of the receiving spouse to produce
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sufficient income for him- or herself, and (3) the ability of the responding
spouse to provide support. Haumont v. Haumont. 793 P.2d 421, 423 (Utah
Ct.App.1990).
The Court held "in considering the above-listed factors, the trial court
must make adequate factualfindingson all material issues unless the facts
in the record are "clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a
finding in favor of the judgment." kL at 434.
1. The trial court carefully considered the financial condition and
needs of the receiving spouse. Ms. Rigby had no disposable income after
her expenses were subtracted from her income, and certainly could not
afford a place to live. Mr. Rigby had approximately $300.00 more in
disposable income after all of his expenses (including a house payment)
than did Ms. Rigby, as outlined in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law (See Addendum D-page 5 paras. 9-19).
Although the court did not outline the math calculations in the
Memorandum Decision or the signed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, the trial court record reflects that the court came to these figures by
carefully considering the income and expenses of the parties and their
disposable income.
2. The trial court was fully informed of the ability of the receiving
spouse to produce sufficient income for herself. Evidence was presented at
trial that Ms. Rigby had done the best she could in mitigating her expenses
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by temporarily living with her mother.
Further evidence was presented concerning her present employment
and her trying to obtain better employment. Mr. Rigby questioned Ms.
Rigby as to her sending out resume's and job applications, and her
present employment with Working RX. (Trial Transcript pages 75-79; and
pages 97-99). Through Ms. Rigby's testimony, it seemed clear that she did
her best to maintain and maximize her employment opportunities.
3. The trial court carefully weighed the ability of the responding
spouse to provide support. In the Memorandum Decision and the Findings
of Fact and Conclusions, the court calculated that after expenses, Mr.
Rigby would have $300.00 in disposable dollars. Because Ms. Rigby had a
need that was greater than one-half of the $300.00 in disposable income,
the court properly did it's best to equalize the parties' financial situations by
dividing the extra money almost in half, and awarding Ms. Rigby $125.00 in
alimony. The record of the trial transcript and the Financial Declarations
clearly bear this out.
It is important to remember that the Court of Appeals has further
stated that so long as these three factors are considered, we will disturb a
trial court's decision concerning alimony only upon a showing "that such a
serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion."

Haumont at 424.
18

Even if the trial court did not show the calculations in it's
Memorandum Decision, or in the Findings of Fact; clearly the record before
the court bears out that there was not a clear abuse of discretion.
It is also clear that the trial court considered the equitable factors of
this being a 33 year marriage, and Mr. Rigby being held in contempt on
numerous charges relating to not providing pertinent economic information,
when the court exercised it's discretion with respect to the alimony award.
II. Did the trial court abuse it's discretion in holding the Petitioner in
contempt, and in dividing the equity in the marital property 15% to
Petitioner and 85% to the Respondent.
Last month, the Utah Court of Appeals stated, "Under Utah law, "in
order to prove contempt for failure to comply with a court order it must be
shown that the person cited for contempt knew what was required, had
the ability to comply, and intentionally failed or refused to do so."" In re
Cannetella, 2006 P.3d 89, (UT Ct. App. March, 2006 ). In each of the
following contempt issues, Mr. Rigby clearly knew what was required, had
the ability to comply, and intentionally failed to do so.
As stated in the Findings of fact and Conclusions of Law, of the six
contempt issues certified for trial, the court heard testimony on four of
them. They were:
a. Whether or not Mr. Rigby should be held in contempt for his failure
to provide a detailed written accounting concerning his 401 (k) at Discover,
19

what monies he took out of his account, when he took the monies, and
what he used them for.
It was found that at trial (belatedly) Mr. Rigby produced a letter dated
September, 16, 2004, regarding the value of the 401 (k) account, but could
not explain what he did with $1000.00 of it nor what the value of it was at
the time of trial seven months later. The court found that Mr. Rigby had the
ability to comply with the previous discovery requests, intentionally failed to
comply, and was deceptive in his responses.
b. Whether or not Mr. Rigby should be held in contempt for his failure
to provide a detailed written accounting concerning the cash value of his
Met Life Insurance Policy, how much it was, when he got the money, and
what he spent it on.
The court found that Mr. Rigby never provided a written accounting
as to the cash value of the Met Life policy. Mr. Rigby testified that he
received $16.00 from the policy, but did not provide proof of his statement
that it had no cash value. (Trial Transcript page 173, paras. 12-21). The
court found that Mr. Rigby had the ability to comply with that potion of an
Order, and intentionally failed to comply.
c. Whether or not Mr. Rigby should be held in contempt for his
failure to provide a detailed written accounting concerning the parties'
personal property that he has disposed of since the parties' separation.
The court found that Mr. Rigby never provided the written accounting
regarding the personal property. Mr. Rigby testified that he sold a marital
20

travel trailer but never provided the written accounting. He stated that he
told his previous counsel about the sale, and that he only received an
amount equaling what was owed on it. (Trial Transcript pages 174-175).
Counsel for Ms. Rigby could not have verified these statements because
the discovery was not provided before the trial, nor was documentation
provided at trial. The court found that Mr. Rigby had the ability to comply
with that potion of an Order, and intentionally failed to comply.
d. Whether or not Mr. Rigby should be held in contempt for his failure
to restore Mrs. Rigby as a covered person on his health insurance, and to
take steps necessary to make sure that she retained her right to survivor
benefits associated with his employment with the federal government.
The court found that Mr. Rigby removed Ms. Rigby from his health
insurance coverage in January, 2004, against a previous court order. Mr.
Rigby claimed he couldn't afford it, while at the same time he removed
$2500.00 on his Wells Fargo credit line so "Ms. Rigby couldn't get it", and
spent $2000.00 on his grandchild. (Trial Transcript pages 158-161 and
169-172). Page 161, paras. 1-2 Mr. Rigby admits to not obeying the court
order to reinstate Ms. Rigby on his insurance policy. The court found that
Mr. Rigby had the ability to comply with that potion of an Order, and
intentionally failed to comply.
Clearly, Mr. Rigby was in contempt of court, and the court had to
weigh how to recompense Ms. Rigby for his contemptuous behavior. The
court reasoned that because Mr. Rigby did not have liquid funds available
21

to pay her attorney's fees for his contempt, and that there was under
$20,000.00 in equity in the marital home after real estate fees are paid,
that the better sanction was to award Ms. Rigby 85% of the home equity,
and 15% to Mr. Rigby. There was testimony that Ms. Rigby had an
attorney's lien for fees upon the marital home in the amount of
approximately $9,000.00 at the time of trial. (Trial Transcript page 149, par.
12).
Mr. Rigby testified that $76,000.00 was owed on the home at the
time of trial. (Trial Transcript page 129, paras. 15-25). After Realtor fees of
6% ($6090.00) against the selling price of $101,500.00, (Trial Transcript
page 27, paras. 1-12), and other fees such as title insurance, doc prep
fees, taxes, etc. (approx $2000.00) the parties are maybe left with
$17,410.00. If this is divided in half as the court stated is normally done,
Ms. Rigby would receive $8,705.00. Minus the attorney fees of $9000.00,
and when further trial attorney's fees are subtracted, Ms. Rigby would owe
a large sum of money. If Ms. Rigby obtains 85% of the equity, she would
likely end up receiving a near equal amount with Mr. Rigby after all
attorney's fees are paid.
III. Petitioner has failed to marshal the evidence.
On appeal, the burden is on the appellant to marshal all the evidence
supporting the trial court's findings and then to show the evidence to be
legally insufficient to support the findings, even when viewed in the light
22

most favorable to the trial court. Doeile v. Bradley. P.2d 1176, 1178 (Utah
1989).
The court in Doeile found that the Appellant "has not attempted to
marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's findings and
demonstrate that the evidence supporting the findings is legally insufficient.
His brief presents the conflicting evidence in a light most favorable to his
position and largely ignores the contrary evidence. Therefore, there is no
reason for us to disturb the trial court's findings. Doeile at 1178-79.
There is nothing in the Appellate's brief evidencing their marshaling
the evidence. None of Appellant's paragraphs point to the record on
appeal, and nothing is stated to support the trial court's findings.
In Rudman, "With an extensive record and thorough findings before
us, we are reluctant to set aside the findings absent clear error." Rudman
v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73, 79 (Ut. Ct App. 1991).
In the present case, the trial transcript is filled with clear facts and
evidence supporting the findings. Without marshaling the evidence, the
Appellant cannot support their arguments and point to areas where the trial
court has abused it's discretion, and as such, the Findings of Fact
Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce should stand, and this appeal
should be denied.
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CONCLUSION
Clearly the trial court had an abundant record to determine a proper
alimony amount, to divide the marital home, and to award attorney's fees.
The trial court also carefully weighed the evidence with respect to holding
Mr. Rigby in contempt on four separate charges. Finally, because
Appellate did not marshal the evidence, this appeal should be denied, and
the on all points the trial court's ruling should be affirmed.
The Appellee also respectfully requests that she be granted her
attorney's fees and costs in this matter given the arguments listed above.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / O ^ d a y of April, 2006.
KESSLER LAW OFFICE

L Kessler, Attorney for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this / O day of April, 2006, I sent via First
Class United States Mail two copies of the foregoing Appellee Brief to the
following:
David J. Friel, Esq.
2875 S. Decker Lake Drive
Suite 225
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119

Kessler
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ADDENDUM A

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR (SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

VERNON RAY RIGBY,
Petitioner,
vs.

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

:

CASE NO- 034903791

s
z

LORALIE KEMP RIGBY,

t

Respondent.

This matter came before the Court for trial on April 27, 2 005.
The Court having taken the matter under advisement, now finds and
rules as follows:
Grounds and Jurisdiction:
The Court finds that it has jurisdiction of this matter, and
that

both the petitioner

and

the respondent have

established

grounds for a divorce based on irreconcilable differences, and
accordingly

the Court will

grant petitioner and respondent a

divorce.
Personal Property:
The parties 1 personal property has been divided since their
separation, and the Court awards to each the personal property now
in their possession.

Mrs. Rigby has possession of the Oldsmobile

vehicle and Mr. Rigby has the Chevrolet truck; Mrs. Rigby to pay

/

AT ^ N

the

indebtedness on

MEMORANDUM DECISION
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the Oldsmobile

and Mr. Rigby

to pay

the

indebtedness on the Chevrolet truck.
Real Property:
The parties own a home at 6993 Loch Ness Avenue in West Valley
City, Utah, with a value of approximately $100,000 to $105,000 in
its present condition.

The home is ordered sold immediately.

Each

party is ordered to cooperate fully with the Court's Order to sell
the real property.

If Mr. Rigby refuses to sign the listing

agreement and/or the sale documents, the clerk of the court is
directed, pursuant to Rule 70 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
to sign either or both documents. The signature of the clerk shall
be deemed the signature of Mr. Rigby.

The legal description of

said real property is:
Lot 32 Glen Heather #1 Subdivision
There is a mortgage on the home with an outstanding balance of
$76,405.14 as of March, 2005.
and

other

expenses

owed

After the payment of realtor fees

against

the

home,

there

should

be

approximately $18,000 to $19,000 that the parties will receive from
the sale.

The Court awards 15 percent of those sale proceeds to

Mr. Rigby and 85 percent of the sale proceeds to Mrs. Rigby.

basis

The

for that percentage division of the sale proceeds is

explained later in this decision.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
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Debts and Obligations:

Mr. Rigby shall pay the following obligations and hold Mrs.
Rigby harmless therefrom:
All
Financial

obligations
Services,

owed

to Cyprus Credit

Inc.,

Credit

Union, Qwest, NCO

Collection

Services,

Coalville/Kamas Health Center, the line of credit with Wells Fargo,
and any indebtedness he has incurred since the parties separated.
Mrs. Rigby shall pay the following obligations and hold Mr.
Rigby harmless therefrom:
The Wells Fargo Visa account and any indebtedness she has
incurred since the parties separated.
Joint Obligations:
Each party shall pay one-half of the R.C. Willey bill.

The

Court anticipates that the home will be sold immediately and from
the sale proceeds the mortgage will be paid, and, therefore, makes
no further Order regarding that indebtedness.
Income:
Mr. Rigby has the following income per month:
$1,180 (gross) Granite School District
$766 (net) federal pension
Mrs. Rigby has gross monthly income of $1,670.

^7 7<^=
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Alimony;
At the present time, Mr. Rigby has monthly income that is
approximately $300 a month more than Mrs. Rigby.

Based upon these

figures, the Court will award alimony to Mrs. Rigby in the amount
of

$125 beginning May, 2005, and continuing until Mrs. Rigby

remarries, or cohabits, or dies, or for a period of time equal to
the length of the marriage, whichever first occurs.
Retirement Accounts:
Mr. Rigby has federal retirement of $766 per month net. Mrs.
Rigby should be awarded a monthly survivor annuity to commence upon
Mr. Rigby f s death to the maximum extent permitted by law.

The

Court understands that in the event Mr. Rigby remarries, that Mrs.
Rigby and a future spouse of Mr. Rigby would share the survivor
annuity as provided by federal law.
Mrs. Rigby has future retirement benefits from her employment
with First Security Bank and Wells Fargo Bank.

Mrs. Rigbyfs

retirement accounts should belong exclusively to her, because Mr.
Rigby cashed in his Discover 401 (k) and did not adequately account
for those funds, even though he had been ordered to do so.
Life Insurance;
Either party may designate the beneficiary of his or her life
insurance policy.

RIGBY V. RIGBY
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Mr, Riabv1s Health Insurance;
Mr. Rigby has health insurance through his federal retirement.
Mrs. Rigby may be able to obtain health coverage as a former
spouse. To the extent federal law permits, Mrs. Rigby is given the
option of obtaining that health coverage, provided Mrs. Rigby pays
for the costs of that coverage.
Contempt:
The Commissioner certified six issues for contempt against Mr.
Rigby.
1.

The Court heard evidence on the following four issues:
Whether or not Mr. Rigby should be held in contempt for

his failure to provide a detailed written accounting concerning his
401 (k) at Discover, what monies he took out of it, when he took the
monies, and what he used them for.
2.

Whether or not Mr. Rigby should be held in contempt for

his failure to provide a written accounting concerning the cash
value of his Met Life policy, how much it was, when he got the
money, and what he spent it on.
3.

Whether or not Mr. Rigby should be held in contempt for

his failure to provide a detailed written accounting concerning the
parties1 personal property that he has disposed of since the
partiesf separation.
4.

Whether or not Mr. Rigby should be held in contempt for

his failure to restore Mrs. Rigby as a covered person on his health

insurance with

MEMORANDUM DECISION
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the federal government, and

to take the steps

necessary to make sure that she retained her right to survivor
benefits

associated

with

his

employment

with

the

federal

government *
The Court addresses each contempt issues in the above order:
1.

Mr. Rigby belatedly provided a letter, dated September

16, 2004, in which he claimed he was "not even sure how much it
[401(k)] was now," but claimed the value had dropped significantly.
At trial, Mr. Rigby testified that he received $5,200 from the
401 (k) . Mr. Rigby could provide no explanation, as to what he had
done with approximately $1,000 of the $5,200.

The Court finds that

Mr. Rigby had the ability to comply with that portion of the Order,
has been deceptive in his responses, and intentionally failed to
comply.
2.

Mr. Rigby never provided a written accounting as to the

cash value of the Met Life policy.

In Court, Mr. Rigby testified

that he received $16 from Met Life, but provided no documentation.
The Court finds that Mr. Rigby had the ability to comply with that
portion of the Order, but intentionally failed to comply.
3.

Mr. Rigby never provided a written accounting regarding

the personal property.

Mr. Rigby testified at trial that he sold

a trailer, but provided no documentation of the sale price or who
purchased it.

The Court finds that Mr. Rigby had the ability to

MEMORANDUM DECISION
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comply with that portion of the Order, but intentionally failed to
comply.
4.

Mr. Rigby removed Mrs. Rigby from his federal health

insurance coverage in approximately January, 2004.

Mr. Rigby

claims that he did so because of his financial condition, and by
doing so it saved him approximately $125 per month.

The Court

notes that the defendant took $2,200 on his credit line with Wells
Fargo,

"so

Mrs.

Rigby

couldn't

get

it."

Mr.

Rigby

spent

approximately $2,000 for the benefit of a grandchild during the
pendency of this proceeding.

The Court finds that Mr. Rigby had

the

that

ability

to

comply

with

portion

of

the

Order,

but

intentionally refused to comply.
The Court finds Mr. Rigby in contempt for failing to comply
with all four portions of the Order.
caused

Mrs. Rigby

to

Mr. Rigby1 s recalcitrance

incur additional

attorney's

fees. As

a

sanction for contempt, the Court would ordinarily impose an award
of attorney's fees against Mr. Rigby. However, the Court believes,
that because of the financial condition of the parties, that a
better sanction is to award Mrs. Rigby a greater portion of the
sale proceeds from the home.

But for Mr. Rigby f s contempt, the

Court would have awarded the proceeds equally to the parties.

For

the foregoing reasons, the Court awards Mrs. Rigby 85 percent and

RIGBY V. RIGBY

MEMORANDUM DECISION

PAGE 8

Mr. Rigby 15 percent of the proceeds from the sale of the home.
Accordingly, no attorney's fees are awarded.
Counsel for respondent, Mrs. Rigby, to prepare the Findings,
Conclusions, and Decree of Divorce.

The divorce to be final when

signed by the Court and entered by the clerk.
Dated this l~J^ day of May, 2005

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this fj~\

day of

May, 2005:

Vernon Ray Rigby
6993 Loch Ness Avenue
West Valley City, Utah 84128
David A. McPhie
Attorney for Respondent
2105 E. Murray-Hoi laday Road
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
—ooOoo- -

VERNON R w

AIM DAVIT Ol
LORALIE RIGBY

P(f;ir
Petitioner,
vs.

h:\ No. 034903791 DA

LORALIE KEMP RIGBY,
Respondent.

• ail
(. OS;.:

suet
I ; \ MIIS

—ooOoo—

STATE OF UTAH
(

1
2

:ss

H \>r r v , v.

.1/,:

"j.ites t h a i "

' •

I1 in .in.

Phii*rney
,aw

'

•.

am the Loralie Rigby who is the Respondent in this action.
r

4

6

)

COMES NOW Loralie Rigby, and being first duly sworn and upon oath, deposes and

3

5

)

am an aciuiu u\ er me age of twenty one, and competent to testify, and 1 have

personal knowledge of the far! contained herein.
3

I proffer that il called io testily, I would state the following.

A

1
2

My husband and I attended one session oi mediation with Bill Downes on

i • i| nil i i \ 1st, 2003

We had high hopes that we would resolve our disputes there. We reached a

tentative agreement on some issues, but since then, we have both backed away from that
4

agreement. 1 lirheve (hat some |MHIIIUIIN nil the mediated agreement an1- salvageahlr

Ms liii'ihanil

however, has utterly refused to do some important things ever since the mediation, and I need the
« ourt to intervene at this point.
/
n

5.

My husband and I have been separated since August 2nd, 2003. I live with my

... ~-i l c r ? h e u v e s \n t h e home and n

te

located at WK> I ,uch (Wss Avenue, W est \ uiiey

Li I ni Willi in \\v w a r in to> -i!

'• ;!'•*•.'

. Mu- mortgage comna?-'

[ they send me copies of notices because it is financed in my name) that Mr. Rigby is behind in
II

the mortgage pa y •*:•. tti

*•*••.•

\ i M f . . « . , :ii

fh>t pm-* me payments owing on i'

mortgage for July, August and September 2003. He now says he caught it up by cashing in his
Discover Lara H- : :. K ; ... i narital asset.
IT15

6.

I believe that the home is worth approximately $114,000.00. We owe about

$80,000.00 against it. This means we have about $34,000 00 in equity. We have been in that
-•••I.- vin. .* i

:

need ! the Coi II t to en: dei Mi R igby tc • make 1 he • payment so as to pi otect oi ir

joint equity. 1 le wanted to stay in the home, and wanted me to leave. He has sole possession M *
I

21

:

.( I.:•,!;• a! ' should be makich* the navment.
7..

For obvio.tis reasons, I also need Mr. Rigby ordered to pay the ongoing obligation

8.

The way our mortgage is set up, the payment includes principal, interest and taxes

1

'*

2

obligation each year is approximately $315.00. I need Mr. Rigby ordered to pay this obligation

3

as it becomes due, and to pay any arrearages immediately,

iierelore, the insurance on the house needs to be paid separate lj " I he ii lsurance

4

Di ii ing the course of our separation, I have asked Mi. K v^hv tor certain items of
property which he agreed to give me at mediation. He said in his deposition taken December

6

1 :r.. ~ ;. , u
10.

IMC IM - -

.nr^i'in i

. ~ ,;

'pertv. t-VH*t^

> ^ >•

\* the time of our mediation, Mi. Ri^/w agreed to give me some items of personal

property out. * tuc House* as soon as he discovered uua . ., jiued a v.-w issues i esol v eel differently •

1

j

than we had discussed tentatively in mediation, he began to ask for changes in the mediated

0

agreement as well. The upshot oi ah \* that he has made *t * cr\ diliicuit to retneve my

11
1?

1i
lo

1 L)
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

P'>SSCNS-IPM^

\

.-hanging til.- -d. • ••

t.

• *u t tSi. .;

'

aest that the Court order Mr. Rigbyto

immediately give me possession of the following:
Warrantee stuff in computer room
Clothes under stairs and craft items
Paper in computer room
f of Holiday decorations
r
of kitchen appliances
>I in kitchen
Timers in {kitchen
Acmechojpper
: 1
- w cooker
Sauce pans, etc.
Recipe cards from the recipe box
Deskpad£
Lid holder
Melmac pjlates in trailer
Afghan hi JanelFs room (red colors)
Books in Storage Shed
Carpet Sweeper

iv id A.
cPhie

3

^7-1

1

V

1

•

:

,

*

•

•

. • • • !

i h Ripbv and 1 previously agreed as he left for California with our trailer, that he

could have the use oi IL oii^ »;.u. . >. wdhi ^iukc the payment to regime; tne trailer, i paia > i ?•-..
4

which he agreed that he would reimburse me for. He has not reimbursed me for it, and I would

5

like judgment for that amount

6
7

12.

During the course of our marriage, we acquired Met Life Insurance policies, and I

was the beneficiary of the policies insuring his life. I am now informed that he has either cashed
-•

\ *

. ' * * ! ! • . ( ,

.urn

t

to me as to what, if anything, he has done with those policies, and if he got any money from them
i : a s f i n i ^ it:

v.. • • •

MtiU'C'

i • • •> ' , ( t i

proceeds.
1

;; K I ^ ' ; *\;io -i i i-'^ii iai employee dill ini: t*ir> woikmg im

\ u \\,i> rcuuial

i J> Employees Government Life Insurance (FEGLI). I have requested that the Court order Mr.
Rigby to cooperate with me to make sure that I am covered under his Federal Health Insurance,

policy is reassigned to Janell and Doug (our children). He admitted in the deposition it is still in

1-

am working and earn $9.1 •
- •

^'i

*

w , . *".'

hour working 40 hours a week. I am working at a

>K:^A .

nau puio<Jb» oi uiieinpitn ;iien.

<iko worked for Wells Fargo for eight years full-time as a secretary and unfortunately, lost that
,wb on AprJ 28th, 2003 I 'hey had a reduction in iorce, ai.w iaid off fifty people in the Salt l.^r

It I I l l

i,

cPhie
orney
Law

~p ex.—

2

15.

For purposes of alimony, my income is the $9.00 per hour full-time, or $1,280.00

3

per month gross. My monthly expenses are outlined on n it.) ' F inancial Declai ation attached here to

4

as Exhibit A... Mr. Riebv's income, on the other hand, is in two forms. He has a Federal Pension

5

of $766.22 per month, which I believe is his net pay. He also works part-time for Granite School
"•" ' -^ .\ %> •• *• ^'~- '-' "*ni ii- W>0„00 per month net "h li Rigby has a total net income of
v

) 1,716,22 per month. 1 believe he has a surplus of funds each month which should be used to

16.

Mr. Rigby's expenses, to the best of my knowledge, are $ 1,250.00 per month, I

I

have a need for alimony, especially .. . :.iovc n.. \ .

i

and I believe that he has some abilitv to assist me.

°
j

17.

- lei "s house and i eiit ai i, apai bnent,

Mr. Rigby identified at his deposition that he is systematically borrowing against,

or liquidating the assets we have accumulated over 30 years to pay his debts. I need him
enjoined from doing so, and to provide an accounting concerning the assets he has already

18.

This is the end of my affidavit.
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Notary Public
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
T

Affidavit u»
2004:

...oil caused to be haii.
-bv to the following, tl«

l a true and correct copy of the foregoing
ay of
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• Cory Wall
WALL & WALL
4460 South Highland Drive, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124
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ADDENDUM C

3RD DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
VERNON RAY RIGBY,
Petitioner,

MINUTES
LAW AND MOTION

vs.

Case No:

0 3 4 9 0 3 7 9 1 DA

LORALIE KEMP RIGBY,
Respondent

C1erk:

Commissioner:
MICHAEL S .
Date:
J a n u a r y 20, 2004

EVANS

carolynw

PRESENT
Petitioner's
P e t i t i o n e r (s)
Attorney for
R e s p o n d e n t (s)
Video

Tape Number:

A t t o r n e y : CORY R WALL
: VERNON RAY RIGBY
t h e R e s p o n d e n t : DAVID A. MCPHIE
: LORALIE KEMP RIGBY

100827

Tape Count: 104057

HEARING
Comm. receives and approves the agreement with regard to the
personal property items being returned to respondent with the
involvement of counsel.
In Dispute Recommendations:
1. With regard to the medical insurance issue: Mr. Rigby is to
forthwith reinstate respondent on the medical insurance policy.
2. The parties are mutually restrained from in any way reducing
the value or disposing of any assets including retirement benefits
or property.
3. With regard to the debts: each party is to use their best
efforts to pay the debts they have been historically paying
4. Mr. Rigby use his best efforts to commence the application for
a refinance and Ms. Rigby cooperate to refinance the home.
5. Mr. Rigby given 60 days from today to accomplish the refinance
and if he is not successful the home be listed for sale with a
mutually agreeable realtor and with a mutually agreeable price.
Page 1

Ml

Case No: 034903791
Date:
Jan 20, 2004
6. Mr. Rigby is to verify if the refinance is accepted or rejected
and identify a closing date if it is accepted. The court will not
order an appraisal at this time.
7. With regard to the request for an accounting: counsel are to
comply with Rule 26 regarding disclosures and a scheduling meeting
and they are to set up the scheduling meeting within 10 days.
8. The issue of temp, alimony is subject to review after the 60
days once the home is either listed for sale or it is refinanced.
The request is denied without prejudice.
9. Mr. Rigby is to maintain all debts including the mortgage
payment.
Mr. McPhie prepare the order

Page 2 (last)
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DAVID A. McPHIE (2216)
Attorney at Law
2105 E. Murray-Holladay Rd.
Holladay, Utah 84117
(801) 278-3700
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IN THE TfflRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
—ooOoo—

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

VERNON RAY RIGBY,
Petitioner,
vs.

Civil No. 034903791 DA

LORALIE KEMP RIGBY,
Respondent.

1

Judge Robert W. Adkins
Comm: Michael S. Evans
-ooOoo-

THIS DIVORCE MATTER came on for trial before the Honorable Judge Robert W.

2

Adkins in his courtroom located at 450 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, on Wednesday,

3

the 27th day of April, 2005 at the hour of 1:30 o'clock p.m.

4

The Petitioner Vernon Ray Rigby appeared in person pro se without counsel, the Court

5

having been notified earlier in a Pretrial Conference that Mr. Rigby had discharged his attorney

6

and desired and intended to represent himself. The Respondent also appeared in person and by

7

and through her attorney of record, David A. McPhie.

8

The Court heard opening statements. Witnesses were called, examined and cross-

1

1

examined by both Petitioner and Respondent. Items of physical evidence were marked, offered,

2

and admitted in evidence.

3

The Court took the matter under advisement at the end of trial which concluded at

4

approximately 6:00 o'clock p.m. that day. The Court later published its decision in this matter

5

via a Memorandum Decision which is 9 pages in length including mailing certificate. A copy of

6

that Memorandum Decision is attached to these Findings as Exhibit A.

7

The Court, having considered the matter fully, including the testimony of the parties, the

8

physical evidence admitted at trial, and the file, and having published its Memorandum Decision,

9

now publishes the following:

10

FINDINGS OF FACT

11
12
13

1.

The Court has jurisdiction in this matter over both the parties and the subject

2.

The testimony of the parties establishes that both parties have grounds for divorce

matter.

14

based on irreconcilable differences, therefore, both should be awarded a Decree of Divorce from

15

the other based on said irreconcilable differences.

16

3.

The parties divided their personal property between them at the time of separation

17

and prior to trial in a manner that they believe is fair and equitable. The Court should award to

18

each of them the items of personal property currently in their possession as their sole and

19

separate property.

2

1

4.

Specifically, Mrs. Rigby has possession of the Oldsmobile vehicle and Mr. Rigby

2

has possession of the Chevrolet truck. Each should be awarded the vehicle in their possession as

3

their sole and separate property, free and clear of any claim of the other, with the requirement

4

that they assume and pay the debt thereon, if any. The parties should sign the documents

5

necessary to clear title on these vehicles.

6

5.

During the course of the marriage, the parties acquired an interest in a home and

7

real estate located at 6993 Loch Ness Avenue, West Valley City, Utah. The testimony at the time

8

of trial was that the offers the parties were receiving for said home which was listed for sale,

9

were in the $100,000 to $105,000 range in its present condition. The Court finds that the home

10
11
12
13

should be sold immediately.
6.

The parties should be ordered to cooperate fully with the broker with whom the

home is currently listed to sell the real estate property.
7.

The Court finds that if Mr. Rigby refuses to sign the Listing Agreement, if a new

14

Listing Agreement is necessary, and/or sale documents with Judy Pearce, the agent with whom

15

the home has been listed, the Clerk of the Court should, pursuant to Rule 70 of the Utah Rules of

16

Civil Procedure, sign said documents for him and in his place. The Court finds that the signature

17

of the Clerk of the Court should be deemed the signature of Mr. Rigby.

18

8.

The legal description of the real estate is:

19

Lot 32 Glen Heather #1 Subdivision, as recorded in the office of the Salt Lake

20

County Recorder.

21

9.

The Court finds that with regard to said home and real estate on Loch Ness

3

1

Avenue, there is an outstanding balance of $76,405.14 as of March 2005. This balance is higher

2

than it would otherwise be if Mr. Rigby had kept the payments on said home and real estate

3

current as he was ordered to do in the temporary order.

4

10.

The Court further finds that after the payment of realtor fees and other expenses

5

owed against the home, there should be approximately $18,000 to $19,000 of equity that the

6

parties will receive from the sale, assuming that it sells for the range of figures referred to above.

7

The Court finds that Mr. Rigby should be awarded fifteen percent (15%) of the sale

8

proceeds, and that eighty-five percent (85%) of the sale proceeds should be awarded to Mrs.

9

Rigby. The Court explains its basis for that percentage division of the sale proceeds later in these

10
11
12

Findings.
11.

The Court finds that Mr. Rigby should pay the following debts and obligations as

his sole and separate obligations, holding Mrs. Rigby harmless from any liability thereon:

13

A.

The debts and obligations owed to Cyprus Credit Union;

14

B.

Qwest;

15

C.

NCO Financial Services, Inc.;

16

D.

Credit Collection Services;

17

E.

Coalville/Kamas Health Center;

18

F.

The Line of Credit with Wells Fargo; and,

19

G.

Any indebtedness he has incurred since the date of the parties' separation.

20
21

12.

The Court finds that Mrs. Rigby should pay the following debts and obligations as

her sole and separate obligations, holding Mr. Rigby harmless from any liability thereon:

4

1

A.

The Wells Fargo Visa Account; and,

2

B.

Any and all indebtedness that she has incurred since the date of the parties'

3

separation.

4

13.

5

Willey bill.

6

14.

The Court further finds that each of the parties should pay one half of the R.C.

The Court finds and anticipates that the home will be sold immediately, and the

7

mortgage thereon will be extinguished from the proceeds of said sale. Therefore, the Court

8

makes no Finding concerning payment of the debt on the home and real estate.

9
10

15.

With regard to the income of the parties, the Court finds that Mr. Rigby has the

following income per month:

11

A.

$ 1,180.00 gross from Granite School District; and

12

B.

$766.00 net from a Federal Pension.

13
14
15

16.

The Court finds that Mrs. Rigby has gross monthly income of $1,670.00 per

17.

The Court finds that at the present time, Mr. Rigby has monthly income that is

month.

16

approximately $300.00 a month more than Mrs. Rigby. Based on these figures and the

17

demonstrated need of Mrs. Rigby, and in an attempt to equalize the parties' economic positions,

18

the Court should award to Mrs. Rigby alimony in the amount of $ 125.00 per month beginning

19

May of 2005, and continuing thereafter until the occurrence of the first of the following events:

20

A.

Mrs. Rigby remarries;

21

B.

Mrs. Rigby cohabitates as defined in Utah Law;

5

1

C.

Mrs. Rigby dies;

2

D.

Mr. Rigby dies;

3

E.

A period of time not to exceed the length of the marriage; or

4

F.

Further order of the Court.

5

18.

The Court finds that Mr. Rigby has federal retirement of $766.00 per month net.

6

Mrs. Rigby should be awarded a monthly survivor annuity to commence upon Mr. Rigby's death,

7

to the maximum extent permitted by law. Mr. Rigby should be ordered to take the steps

8

necessary to establish or reestablish Mrs. Rigby as the beneficiary of the survivor annuity, and

9

provide evidence that said action has been taken and is in place. In the event that Mr. Rigby

10

remarries, the Court finds that a subsequent spouse may share the survivor annuity as provided

11

for by federal law.

12

19.

The Court further finds that Mrs. Rigby accumulated retirement benefits from her

13

employment with First Security Bank and Wells Fargo Bank. These retirement benefits should

14

be awarded exclusively to her because Mr. Rigby cashed in his Discovery 401(k) and did not

15

adequately account to the Court for those funds, even though he had been ordered to do so.

16

20.

With regard to life insurance policies, each of the parties should be allowed to

17

designate as the beneficiary of his or her own life insurance policy, any person that they may

18

choose. Each of the parties should be awarded the ownership of their own life insurance policies.

19

21.

The Court finds that Mr. Rigby has health insurance for himself and for his wife

20

or a former spouse through his federal retirement. Mrs. Rigby may be able to obtain health

21

coverage as a former spouse. To the extent that federal law permits Mrs. Rigby to receive health

6

1

insurance, she is given the option of obtaining that health coverage and Mr. Rigby is ordered to

2

cooperate to accomplish the same with the condition that Mrs. Rigby pay for the cost of that

3

coverage.

4
5
6

At the time of trial, several issues of contempt, i.e. six, were certified for hearing

against Mr. Rigby. TheCourtheardevidenceonfourof those issues. Those issues were:
A.

Whether or not Mr. Rigby should be held in contempt for his failure to

7

provide a detailed written accounting concerning his 401(k) at Discover,

8

what monies he took out of the account, when he took the monies, and

9

what he used them for.

10

B.

Whether or not Mr. Rigby should be held in contempt for his failure to

11

provide a written accounting concerning the cash value of his Met Life

12

Insurance policy, how much it was, when he got the money, and what he

13

spent it on.

14

C.

Whether or not Mr. Rigby should be held in contempt for his failure to

15

provide a detailed written accounting concerning the parties' personal

16

property that he has disposed of since the parties' separation.

17

ivid A.
cPhie
orney
Law

22.

D.

Whether or not Mr. Rigby should be held in contempt for his failure to

18

restore Mrs. Rigby as a covered person on his health insurance with the

19

federal government, and to take steps necessary to make sure that she

20

retained her right to survivor benefits associated with his employment with

21

the federal government.

With regard to said contempt issues, the Court finds that:
A.

With regard to the Discover 401(k), Mr. Rigby belatedly provided a letter
dated September 16th, 2004 in which he claimed he was "not even sure
how much it [401(k)] was now", but claimed that the value had dropped
significantly. At trial, Mr. Rigby testified that he received $5,200.00 from
the 401 (k). Mr. Rigby could provide no explanation as to what he had
done with approximately $1,000.00 of the $5,200.00. The Court finds that
Mr. Rigby had the ability to comply with that portion of the order, has
been deceptive in his responses, and intentionally failed to comply.

B.

With regard to the Met Life Insurance policy, the Court finds that Mr.
Rigby never provided a written accounting as to the cash value of the Met
Life policy. In Court, Mr. Rigby testified that he received $16.00 from
Met Life, but provided no documentation. The Court finds that Mr. Rigby
had the ability to comply with that portion of the Order, but intentionally
failed to comply.

C.

With regard to personal property of the parties, the Court finds that Mr.
Rigby never provided a written accounting concerning the personal
property. He testified at trial that he sold a trailer, but provided no
documentation of the sale price or who purchased it. The Court finds that
Mr. Rigby had the ability to comply with that portion of the Order, but
intentionally failed to comply.

8

1

D.

The Court finds that Mr. Rigby removed Mrs. Rigby from his federal

2

health insurance coverage in approximately January of 2004. Mr. Rigby

3

claims that he did so because of his financial condition, and by doing so, it

4

saved him approximately $125.00 per month. The Court notes that the

5

Respondent took $2,200.00 on the credit line with Wells Fargo "so Mrs.

6

Rigby couldn't get it". Mr. Rigby spent approximately $2,000.00 for the

7

benefit of his grandchild during the pendency of this proceeding. The

8

Court finds that Mr. Rigby had the ability to comply with that portion of

9

the Order, but intentionally refused to comply.

10
11

24.

The Court finds Mr. Rigby in contempt for failure to comply with all four portions

of the Order. Mr. Rigby's recalcitrance caused Mrs. Rigby to incur additional attorney's fees.

12

25.

The Court would ordinarily impose an award of attorney's fees against Mr. Rigby

13

for his contempt. However, the Court finds that because of the financial condition of the parties,

14

that a better sanction is to award Mrs. Rigby a greater portion of the sale proceeds from the

15

home.

16

26.

The Court finds that but for Mr. Rigby's contempt, the Court would have awarded

17

the proceeds equally to the parties. For these reasons, the Court awards Mrs. Rigby eighty-five

18

percent (85%) of the sale proceeds and Mr. Rigby fifteen percent (15%) of the sale proceeds of

19

the home as is stated above. The Court finds that Mrs. Rigby should be awarded no separate

20

award of attorney's fees.
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1

Based on the above Findings of Fact, the Court makes the following:

2

3
4

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

The parties and each of them should be awarded a Decree of Divorce from the

other dissolving the bonds of matrimony heretofore existing between them, the same to become

5 final upon the signing and entry thereof.
6
7
8
9

10
11

2.

The Decree of Divorce should be consistent with and congruent with the Findings

of Fact outlined immediately above.
DATED this /->

day of

-^jL^l^v

BY THE COURT:
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

2
3
4

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law to the following, postage prepaid this 2-41^ Day of
\M0AA
, 2005:

5
6
7

Vernon R. Rigby
6993 Loch Ness Avenue
West Valley City, Utah 84128
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